A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological Sciences by A. Reutlinger

By A. Reutlinger

This primary complete size remedy of interventionist theories of causation within the social sciences, the organic sciences and different higher-level sciences the offers unique counter arguments to contemporary developments within the debate and serves as helpful advent to the topic.

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Statements of this form can be used to express information about quantitative eventtypes, qualitative event-types, and actual event-tokens of a quantitative or qualitative event-type. A basic event-type statement asserts that a variable takes one of its possible values. Basic event statements can be used to build complex statements by linking basic statements via logical connectives, such as the following complex statement X = x and Y = y, not-Y = y, X = x or Y = z, if X = x, then Y = y, if X = x and not-Y = y, then Z = z and so on.

2). More neutrally and with less commitment to the linear character of structural equations it may be written as a function: y = fY(xi, u) with the Xi as the set parY of parents of Y. By convention, we may call a causally interpreted Bayesian network a ‘structural causal model’, if its causal information can be expressed by a set of structural equations. 12 Therefore, ‘Y = fY(Xi, U)’ is not equivalent to ‘fY(Xi, U)’ = Y.

Modal character: Interventions are not required to be possible in the sense that they are feasible actions for human agents. Rather, the possibility of intervening is pictured here in a modally less restrictive sense. The key idea seems to be that interventionists want to say that, according to their theory of causation, it is, in principle, possible to intervene. Following this line of thought, Woodward (2003: 128) rejects the idea that interventions need to be physically possible; he requires merely that interventions be logically possible.

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